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Weitere Informationen: Debugging in WordPress (engl.). (Diese Meldung wurde in Version 6.7.0 hinzugefügt.) in /www/htdocs/w0141e1a/armin-wildfeuer.de/wordpress/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6114js_composer wurde zu früh ausgelöst. Das ist normalerweise ein Hinweis auf Code im Plugin oder Theme, der zu früh läuft. Übersetzungen sollten mit der Aktion init oder später geladen werden. Weitere Informationen: Debugging in WordPress (engl.). (Diese Meldung wurde in Version 6.7.0 hinzugefügt.) in /www/htdocs/w0141e1a/armin-wildfeuer.de/wordpress/wp-includes/functions.php on line 6114Abstract:<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n I speak as a philosopher about the problem of the dialectical relation between our ideas of \u201creason\u201d and \u201cfreedom\u201d which determines the western idea of (political, spiritual, scientific, ethical, personal etc.) \u201eorder\u201c. In the history of ideas there are three rational orders, which must be seen as related to each other: the natural order of the cosmos, the divine order of god, and the intellectual, scientific, or political orders of the human beings. All orders have their own rationality. In modern times, any order is acceptable only when (as long as) it is the result of rational considerations and free decision. The dialectic of freedom and reason is considered as the origin of any order, which is acceptable, rationally and morally justifiable (like the order of the state, the order of science, the order of economy, the order of law, etc). In other words: according to the intellectual development of Western thought, every order must be a rational order of freedom. <\/p>\n\n\n\n I try to explain which philosophical developments lead to this result in\nform of a short history of ideas. In addition, I hope the contemporary\nself-conception and the identity of the Western people can be better understood\nin front of this historical background. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Structure and contents of the lecture:<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. The\nproblem: the relation between order and freedom<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.1 The anthropological starting\npoint: the human need for orientation<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.2 In question: which order \u2013 which\nfreedom – which priority?<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.3 The perspective: an order of\nfreedom?<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. A\nshort history of the problem: the struggle for the primacy of freedom or order<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.1 The objective reason of the\ncosmos and the primacy of the cosmic order<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.2 The medieval \u201cordo\u201d-thinking: human\nfreedom under the primacy of an absolute order <\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.2.1 From immanent to transcendent principle of order: God as an\nabsolute reason<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.2.2 Christian thinking and rational understanding: divine order and\nhuman freedom \u2013 a relation of obedience<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.3 Order under the primacy of\nabsolute freedom<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.4 The universalization of the\nprimacy of freedom in modernity<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.5 The misunderstanding of freedom\nand the depotentiation of reason and order<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3 An order of freedom: \u201csapientis est ordinare\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The peaceful coexistence of people can only be successful (if it is\ncarried by) on a foundation of basic common orientations. Such\norientations that ensure a common order of coexistence are naturally not given\nto human beings – like to the animals in form of instincts and impulses that\nensure the functional fit in the respective environment. First of all human\nbeings have to find a common order of their coexistence and accept it as\nvaluable. That man is not oriented by nature, but must seek and find\nguidance by deciding to accept an order on the background of free choice and\nrational insight, an order, which will be decisive for his thoughts and\nactions, this is the anthropological core of the human constitution how the modern\nphilosophical anthropology teaches. Human beings have no choice: by nature,\nthey are not orientated, they should look for an order by themselves, which\nthen works like a “second” nature they must build and form by\nthemselves. This we can learn already from Aristotle. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Lacking a natural guidance for thinking and acting for the human there is a\nkind of “compensation” for this “natural”\ndisadvantage: the faculty of \u201creason\u201d and the ability of reasoning,\nwhich are essential to the self-image of man, his ability for orientation\nin the world and as well for the execution of his freedom. As the will needs\nrational insight to find the right decisions. But who wants to follow the\nreason in thoughts and actions <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, how do we find such reasonable and\nrational orientations? When we consider the history of thoughts we can\nconclude: reasons are everywhere where we assume an order or a rational\nstructure with well-formed relations: we speak of a rational order of thought,\na reasonable order of nature, a reasonable order of society, of cultures and\ncultural communities, an order of language, of institutions, an order of state,\nof moral systems, we speak of a legal order, an order of economy, of science or\nan order of religions etc. An order is a real order, works like an order and\ncan be called an order only if it is reasonable and coherent, that means: it\nconsists of comprehensible internal relations, which form a completely\nconnected system of reasons and consequences, causes and effects, principles\nand derivations. Every order must be dominated by an internal coherent\nstructure, which can be explained rationally. In addition, it seems that on a\nlong run the stability and solidity of societies, nations, and cultures, which\nfollow certain existing orders of coexistence depend on their reasonable\ncoherence or rational justification, which helps the people to follow the given\norders. <\/p>\n\n\n\n For the human individual, the\norientation on such orders is his own task, power, and responsibility. We can\nspeak of responsibility only if something happens not only freely but\nrationally too. Therefore, everyone is responsible not only for his thinking\nand acting but also for the choice of the orders he follows as general\norientation for his thinking and acting. That means in a strict sense and in\nconsequence: when we praise or blame someone that he follows or does not follow\na given order (the order of the law, of the religion, of moral), it is\npresupposed that his orientation on this order was the result of a free and\nrational choice or acceptance, because responsibility presupposes freedom and\nrational insight. Not only the orientation on a\ngiven order must be justified in this way, the fundamental order that\norientates the concrete orders must be justified rationally and chosen freely,\ntoo. This is the only possibility to take in account and respect the moral subjectivity\nof the individual. As a moral responsible subject the man looks for\norders from a position of freedom and rationality, he looks for orders which\nare reasonable and respect his basic claim on freedom; and if the given orders fulfil\nthis condition he decides himself to follow them. That means: The decision to\nfollow an order must be seen as a free choice and a result of a rational\ninsight. This respects not only the typical human condition of which the modern\nanthropology speaks but is necessary according to the human ability of freedom\nand rationality, which constitutes the dignity of man. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The real and\nconcrete orders of societies, of states and constitutions, of economic and\nscientific systems etc. in one culture or civilisation are not monolithic\norders, which stand for themselves or are justified only by themselves. It is a\nclaim of our understanding that they must be connected one to another to work\ntogether harmonically and without problems in a long run. The claim of rational\ncoherence forced us to look for a higher order from which the real orders get\ntheir ultimate justification. Only the relation of all real orders to a higher\norder guarantees the rational coherence of our orientations. This higher order must\nbe an order in a deeper sense. Such an order must work like an ultimate\njustification or normative orientation for all our trials to establish concrete\nor real orders. This metaphysical order must be able to explain the correctness\nand the legitimacy of existing human orders. These must be in rational\ncoherence with it. And this order has to be asked how it is able to integrate\nthe rational constitution of human beings and the claim to freedom. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Western philosophy is\nsince its origins \u201clogo-centric\u201d by nature. In this history, we can find three big\nideas of such founding orders which are concerted like three rational systems\nwhich justify and orientate the concrete human orders. These three orders which\nwe can identify as a natural, a divine, and a human order have their own\nrationality and coherence which works in an objective given way like the\nnatural order, or works in an absolute way like the divine order, or in a\nsubjective finite way like the human order. Therefore, we can speak about three\nkinds of reasons, which dominate these three orders: the absolute reason, the\nobjective reason, and the subjective reason. I will shortly explain those three\norders of reason:<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short: Throughout\nthe history of philosophy there are three last orders known, which give\norientation for man: <\/p>\n\n\n\n Indeed, a look\nat the history of philosophy shows that there was always a kind of natural\ntension between the idea of rational order and human freedom. It is easy to explain\nthis tension: <\/p>\n\n\n\n Neither an order without real freedom nor freedom\nwithout any order is helpful and useful for the life and the self-understanding\nof man. Instead, the relation between order and freedom must be constructed and\ncan be understood as a dialectical one. In respect to the history and the\nlogical development of the Western Philosophy the starting point of this\ndialectical construction cannot be the idea of order (which is more an static\nideal) but must be the idea of a well understood freedom (which has an\nintrinsic dynamic structure and is fit for a reasonable dialectical movement).\nThis can be demonstrated as evident on all levels of the idea of freedom, which\ncannot be seen as real freedom without relation to a reasonable order:<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short,\nfreedom and rational order seem not to get simply along without each other and are\nmutually dependent. At the same time, they are\nwithin a certain tension. How the\nmodern problem of this tension between order and freedom was generated needs a\nview into the history of Western thought. In the following I will try to reconstruct the genealogy of the\nproblem, and I will argue that on the background of this history legitimate and\njustifiable order can only be understood as coming from freedom. Therefore, the\nintention of orders always has to preserve the original freedom of man. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The\npre-Christian antiquity saw the world dominated by a beginningless eternal order.\nAs this order was ever since like the cosmos itself, it needed no origin for\nits explanation, because the world had no beginning and no end. Its rationality\nis manifested in the harmony and regularity of natural processes and in the good\norderliness of the state. While the specific individual things are\ntransient, their rise and fall is regulated and guided by eternal ideas, by the\neternal \u201clogos\u201d of the world which works like an internal law of the cosmos. These\nlaws are static and not dynamic. These forms remain stable in all\nsuperficial change. The subjective-human reason, which participates at the\nlogos of the world, can \u2013 however – recognize this order, which is reflected in\nthe individual things as their universal or essence and therefore. Epistemology\nand metaphysics, knowledge and ontology fall together because both take measure\nat the nature of things. The appropriate reference to this metaphysical\norder guarantees truth and certainty of knowledge as well as the success of\nlife.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In short: The eternal order,\nwhich manifests itself in the structures of the world and in the nature of the state\ncan be described as objective reason. It enables orientation and knowledge of\nthe world for subjective human reasons. The order of the world did not\nneed a divine reason as a creator of its order because it was eternal and the law,\nthe well-formed structure, the nature of the world has always been in the\nworld. That the world has a beginning and an end, was as unimaginable as\nthat there may be something historically new. Only in this context, it can\nbe understood that history in ancient times is imagined as the steady recurrence\nof the same.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The subjective reason of man was called the \u201cnous\u201d or intellect. His task\nwas to recognize this given order of the world by a kind of intuition, called\n\u201ctheoria\u201d of the ultimate principles of this order. The \u201cdianoia\u201d had only the\ntask to deal with this connecting them to the experience. Whereas the will had\nonly the task to follow the insights of the human mind under the guidance of\nthe intellect whose primacy was grounded in the connection with the eternal\norder. Everyone who could not follow the insights of the intellect in his\nacting was either stupid, weak-willed, or simply evil. The freedom of the\nwill was not even a question. Freedom only was discussed primarily as\nliberty in a political sense. Therefore, the question of the primacy of order or\nfreedom could not arise. The parallelism of objective and subjective reason was\nsimply accepted as a normative standard in antiquity. The rationality of the world and the human being needed\nno relation to a third party from which they received their rational standards.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This situation changes with\nthe Stoic philosophy and finally the philosophy of Neo-Platonism,\nespecially the philosophy of Plotinus, whose\ninterpretation of the logos as an transcendent principle of all forms of\nrationality and the later identification of this idea with the Christian God\nallows to speak now of God as an “absolute reason” which is seen as\nthe origin of all reasonable orders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Stoic\nphilosophy thought it to be possible to call the \u201clogos\u201d as God and to identify\nboth. In accordance to the\nHellenistic philosophy, it was not forgotten that Plato had called the \u201cnous\u201d\nas God and that for Aristotle the\nfirst unmoved mover is seen as \u201cnoesis noeseos\u201d. The first unmoved mover as\neternal \u201cnous\u201d is imagined like a permanent self-thinking and eternal self-recognizing\nthinking, therefore, determined as an absolute rational, absolute coherent\nintellectual activity without any mistake or failure. On this background, the \u201clogos\u201d-idea\nis also gaining entrance into the philosophy and theology of medieval\nChristianity \u2013 and later in the philosophy of the Islamic world. On\nthis way, the \u201clogos\u201d changes from an\nimmanent principle of world-events (as yet in the Stoa), to a transcendent,\nabsolute principle especially in the Neoplatonism. This happened more powerful already in the Prologue of\nJohn’s Gospel, where God is introduced as pre-existent Christ who is determined\nas the incarnate \u201clogos\u201d, as logos creator<\/em> of the world:\n“In the beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God and the Word\nwas God. In the beginning, it was with\nGod. All things were made \u200b\u200bthrough\nhim, and without him nothing happened.” All what exists therefore must be\nseen as grounded in God\u2019s reason, as mentioned by the Christian early\ntheologian Tertullian.<\/p>\n\n\n\n With the emergence of the idea\nof an “absolute reason” which was reinforced by the neoplatonic philosophy\nof Plotinus the \u201clogos\u201d changed from a static to a genetic-dynamic principle. God\u2019s\noriginal acting which was determined as a \u201ccreation out of nothing\u201d was now\ninterpreted as a process guided by his absolute reason. The world was seen as\nthe product of the absolute reason. And as creation of an absolute reason it had\nto be rational, harmonious and coherent, too – despite its phenomenal\nmultiplicity and diversity and despite its oppositions in the visible\nforeground. In the background of the visible individual things there is an\norder which is visible only for the human intellect. Only the intellect can see\nin a special kind of intuition or contemplation that behind the visible world\nthere is an order, which guides all single things and guarantees the harmony of\nthe world, an \u201cobjective order\u201d given by the absolute reason of God and\ntherefore participating at the absolute order of him. Plotinus explained this by\nthe fact that the cosmos must be understood as an emanation of the supreme\nprinciple. As the \u201cobjective reason\u201d of the world is grounded in the \u201cabsolute\nreason\u201d the human mind as a created \u201csubjective reason\u201d can find orientation by\nfollowing the \u201cobjective reason\u201d. He can find the \u201cabsolute reason\u201d indirectly\nby recognizing the \u201cobjective reason\u201d. That is possible because \u201clogos\u201d is also\nthe essence of the human soul and coincides with the ego. However, as a \u201csubjective\nreason\u201d it is a discursive faculty, which mediates between the pure knowledge\nof the intellect and of sense experience. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This Christian\nPlatonism remained the dominant philosophy of the Middle Ages until the\nreception of Aristotle in the 12th<\/sup> century. The Platonic ideas are\nconsistently understood as in the mind of God. These ideas in the intellect of God are the principles\nby which God firstly in the act of creation brings order, meaning and direction\nin the shapeless mass of matter. This divine\nrational order of the world is now seen as standard of knowledge and action for\nthe finite human reason. The real point of reference of human knowledge were\nthe overruling universals behind the particular things, the divine, first of\nall order-giving ideas, the divine cosmos, finally the divine intellect\n(intellectus divinus), in which human reason objectively finds orientation and\nguidance. However, the human possibility\nof this relecture of the nature with the help of the ideas in the mind of God\nrequires a certain parallelism between divine and human reason. This certain\nparallelism was guaranteed by the biblical doctrine of the divine-likeness of\nman as \u201cimago Dei\u201d. It manifests itself – so the\nGreek Fathers of the Church – in the possession of reason and freedom. To be awarded both, makes the special human\ndignity, how in particular the Greek church father Gregory of Nyssa,\nhighlighted forcefully. (Here I must make an important annotation which\nexplains something very important and decisive for the difference of the\nChristian and the Islamic view of man: in opposite to the Christian Thinkers\nthe Islamic-arab Thinkers like al-Kindi, ar-Razi, al-Farabi or Ibn Sina (called\nin Latin \u201cAvicenna\u201d), which all share the neoplatonic view of the relation\nbetween God, world and man, the idea of the man as \u201cimago dei\u201d which in\nChristian tradition is used to explain the strong rational abilities of man\ndespite of his freedom and which grounds the dignity of every man independent\nof his religion, plays a less important or even role in Islamic-Arab philosophy\nand theology. Sometimes it is thought as suspicious or is simply not accepted\nbecause seen as heretic. In consequence, there is less confidence into the\nabilities of the human reason as we can see for example in the related\nphilosophy of al-Ghazali: truth and insight is possible for man only if it is\ngiven by a divine revelation and needs authorities like prophets who receive\nthe truth exclusively and communicate it to the people in form of a book.\nTherefore, it is only consequent that Muslim people must believe not only in\nGod but in the prophet, too. There is less confidence in the power of\nsubjective reason and the abilities of human freedom. Every finite order which\nis the result of a dialectic of reason and freedom therefore must be seen as\nsuspicious). <\/p>\n\n\n\n My task now\nis to explain mainly the role of freedom in the mediaeval-neoplatonic view: The mutual reference of divine and human reason\nto the objective reason of the natural order was the grounding reason, why order\nand freedom were seen as compatible with each other in the Middle Ages \u2013 but with\na priority for order. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At this point we should\nremember that in antiquity freedom was mentioned primarily in terms of outer,\npolitical freedom. In the Christian Middle Ages\nthe idea of an “inner freedom” of the will or a real freedom of\nchoice arises. In the letters of Saint Paul\nand in withdrawal from the Mosaic Law, the question of the inner freedom of man is a focal point of his preaching\nunder the title “law of liberty”. Saint Augustine characterizes the Christian tradition\nthrough his doctrine of \u201cliberum arbitrium\u201d, the freedom of choice, for almost\na millennium. This freedom did not seem\nproper destructive, and so it had to be made \u200b\u200bcompatible with the medieval idea\nof \u201cordo\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n But under neoplatonic conditions\nfreedom can only mean to be in accordance to the order established by God. To act\nin opposite to this divine order is seen as a deficit of freedom, finally because God reacts and\nfights back to maintain the order given by himself: the consequences are illness,\nsuffering, and death. All disorders caused by pure instincts, inclinations, desires, etc. violate\nthe divine order. They are rejected as sin. Finally, the medieval man could not imagine that finite\nman could break the order of the infinite God by his own finite power. Therefore,\nsuperhuman, quasi semi-divine\nforces were adopted, demons, ghosts, devils, semi-spirits etc. were adopted as\nthe underlying cause of such non-compliance. The physical body, which was identified as the principle\nof disorder, was a gateway of their work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The freedom of God was conceived according to this\ntopos and therefore formed no particular theme. God acts always and necessarily according to its nature\nthat means in consequence: order and freedom are always identical in God and\nHis work like reason and will, wisdom and power. The very fact that God acts always according to his\npure wisdom and goodness, constitutes the divine freedom. Freedom and omnipotence of God cannot be understood\notherwise than as an ordinate action<\/em>, which means: according to the eternal order of creation,\nunderstood. It is simply not conceivable\nthat God acts except the eternal order. The divine and eternal order of idea, one might say,\nis the higher-ranking representation of the essence of God than freedom. Based on the assumed ability to God\u2019s reason we could\nsay: The divine mind or intellect dominates the divine will. This\nintellectualism is the base of the priority of reason and order in the Middle\nAges.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For human reason thus guarantees\nthe order of the world because God was not a chaotic arbitrary God; he created\nthe world not arbitrary but in accordance to the laws he have given as absolute\nreason. But the relation of divine\norder and human freedom has to be seen as a relation of obedience. Only this\nobedience and compliance guaranteed human reason that it gets a stable and\nsuccessful orientation for its thinking and acting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This\nrelation of order between absolute, objective, and subjective reasons breaks down\nat the end of the Middle Ages. This collapse was caused by the reception\nof Aristotle in the 12th century, a reception which was initiated by the Spanish-Muslim\nthinker Ibn Rushd, in Latin called \u201cAverroes\u201d (By the way: the Aristotelian\nphilosophy of Averroes had great effects in the Christian world but was more or\nless ignored totally in the Muslim-Arab world whose philosophical thinking\nremained orientated on the neoplatonic metaphysics. Indeed, the way of thinking\nof the oriental and the occidental world begins to divorce at this historical\npoint). However: With the reception of the original and not neoplatonic\nreinterpreted Aristotle the relation of order and freedom becomes a problem in\nthe Western Philosophy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This development has to do\nwith the change in the consciousness of freedom in the late Middle\nAges. The reasons for this development are originally theological. The\nrelationship between the absolute reason of God, the objective reason of the\nworld, and the finite subjective reason of man, which guaranteed the unity of\norder and freedom, at the end of the 13th century was made dubious by the concept\nof absolute freedom of God.<\/em> The absolute freedom of God has already been discussed since the 10th\ncentury: the question was whether a God could be called free and omnipotent,\nwhose will was determined and forced to follow always his own intellect. Ultimately\nthere were religious-theological reasons, which led to a resolution of the\nunity of order and freedom as to the end of the medieval \u201cordo\u201d-thinking. A\nGod who has delivered the people, who granted forgiveness to the sinners, and\nis able to do miracles, acts ultimately not according to the measure of an\neternal order, but his almighty actions must be thought as coming from divine\nfreedom at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It was in particular William\nof Ockham, who developed the concept of freedom of God in a strong consequence,\nby distinguishing in God two powers in his acting: there is a divine acting with\nabsolute power (facere de potentia absoluta)<\/em> and otherwise\nthere is a divine acting with ordinated power (facere de potentia\nordinata).<\/em> I must explain these\ntwo forms of power a little bit:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Potentia absoluta<\/em> means that the action of God must be\nthought as independent of any given order. His will and action is not\ngiven an order or must follow a law, but they are “above” any order in\nthe sense of logical priority. Any order, even an eternal order, must be\nthought as intended by God\u2019s will. Any order, even the eternal, can be\nlogically reduced to an act of will. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The will is the origin of any\norder. But God\u2019s absolute acting and order-setting is not “inordinate”<\/em>, that means, without order or even\nagainst the order. Rather, his will is an order-producing will. And\nhe acts then according to his self-given order. He determines the actions\ncorresponding to the desired order by himself. It is therefore one and the\nsame will and one and the same action, which is free in one respect and order-related\nin another respect. In the perspective of God an act of absolute power (facere\nde potentia absoluta)<\/em> always includes an act of order-related\nand order-setting power (facere de potentia ordinate)<\/em> therefore not\nsufficient. And vice versa any facere de potentia ordinata<\/em> includes\na facere de potentia absoluta<\/em>. Therefore freedom has the\npriority against order. There is no “absolute” order anymore. Whit\nthis construct it is the first time in the Greco-Christian tradition that a\nreal “new” order as anything “new” at all is conceivable\nand legitimate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This simultaneity\nof \u201cfacere absolute\u201d and \u201cfacere ordinate\u201d was transmitted even by the\ntheologians of the 14th century to the doctrine of human freedom, so that the\nfreedom of man is thinkable in analogy to the double structure of the freedom of\nGod – a transfer which was justified with the well-known \u201cimago dei\u201d- doctrine. An\nacting according to an order – if it is to be free action – must be established\nin an original act of pure freedom; but this free action is realized not\n“absolutistic”, but as the production of order. Freedom is therefor, one might say, the legitimacy\nof order. The sense of\norder is the arranging and realizing freedom. This applies not only to the acting of God but\nto the acting of man, too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What are the\nconsequences of this doctrine of freedom for the development and the course of Modern\nTimes? First of all, Ockham\u2019s doctrine is nominalistic and voluntaristic,\nbecause it is now thinkable that God produces merely single things, too, when\nhe wants it. But in the view of the man: when there is the danger that there\nare purely single things without connection to ontological universals then it\nseems possible that the divine order and in consequence the objective order of\nthe world is lack of coherence. The subjective reason of man encouraged by the\ndoctrine of \u201cimage dei\u201d must for himself finally give himself an order. The\nfunction of God for science and the knowledge of man must be reinterpreted. We\nknow the result: in modern time, we should make science \u201cetsi deus non\ndaretur\u201d, as if there would be no God. And we make all orders under the\nperspective: \u201cetsi deus non daretur\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In the process of\nsecularization of modern times, there happens a universalization of the primacy\nof freedom with respect to any order. In this process, human reason took\nthe vacant place of God as the absolute reason. It sees itself as freedom\nand thus the secular heritage of the former theologically understood facere\nde potentia absoluta.<\/em> The human reason is the new origin and the\nsovereign author of any order and any legitimate law. Only the human\nreason gives law and order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ockham’s nominalism dominated\nin the 14th and 15th centuries almost all European universities and influenced all\nareas of life and science. It was crucial for western modernity that in the process of\nsecularization the dominance of the question of God was restricted as\nunimportant. The theology had to give its leading position among the scientiae to\nthe philosophy and the emerging sciences. The divine reason and in\nconsequence the natural order of the world were no longer able to offer a reliable\nknowledge for the orientation of man. In thus way the way was open to a\nuniversalization of the idea of \u200b\u200bfreedom. <\/p>\n\n\n\n We can conclude: The man\nentered the former position of God and gave an order to the world. Every\nacceptable order must be an order of freedom. The man claims authority for any\norder setting in the course of modern times – regardless of divine and natural\norders. The human reason is the new origin and the sovereign author of any\norder and legitimate law \u2013 in the field of science, education, politics,\neconomics, art, society or in the field of morals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n In general, the human reason\nsees itself as the new lawgiver who has taken over the legislative competence from\nthe old instances, namely theology and metaphysics. These releases rarely have\nthe tendency to despotism, they are not chaotic or anarchic as we can see in\nseveral fields: <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the\nprimacy of freedom is not only a story of success. It also causes problems if\nfreedom is set absolutely: If Freedom is not understood as transcendental as\nthe primary condition of order but historically, it follows, that the reason\nmust produce successively new laws, regulations, and orders to demonstrate its\nessence as absolute freedom. Freedom then is not understood as the unity\nof absolute and ordinate action, rather than making new things, as modernity of\nfacts. “Change” becomes a value in itself, and historically\nvalid can be only the New, again and again, how claims the postmodern\nphilosophy. This infinite progressiveness\nof the New does not have a goal; it is due to a misunderstood absoluteness\nof freedom in the perspective of a negative freedom, which means an orderless\nindependence of all and which forgets that freedom as autonomy is freedom, only\nif it produces real and concrete orders. Otherwise, freedom is a source of\ndisorientation, as is impressively demonstrated in postmodernism. Therefore, the\nGerman philosopher Hermann Krings can speak of a “self-misunderstanding of\nreason as an absolute freedom”. <\/p>\n\n\n\n We have seen\nthat in modern times the model of absolute freedom, originally connected with\nthe potestas<\/em> Dei, is claimed by the human reason. This\ntransformation is ambivalent. The man is not like God, also not if he sees\nhimself as absolutely free. Man is a finite being; and though he\nclaims his freedom as essential to order, it is nevertheless finite\nfreedom. As such, the human reason needs the insight that freedom is\nalways related to order. The problem of an unconditional, but finite freedom is\nthe problem of Western modernity. These problems will only be avoided if\nfreedom and law, freedom and order remain dialectically related to each other:\nFor freedom without reference to a rational order is anarchy, chaos, and\narbitrariness. Nevertheless, as a result of our history we cannot accept\nthe reverse perspective any longer, an order without freedom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The claim of freedom is\nunconditioned. This claim would remain general, formal, and empty without the attempt\nto realize it in practical systems of freedom, in the real and concrete orders\nmade by man and which guide the real life of people. Freedom can only be\nrealized by putting systems or orders as the condition of its existence. Nevertheless,\nthere remains a tension between freedom and order that cannot be resolved: the\nconcept of order means in principle a “totality of necessary rational\nrelationships”. That contradicts with the concept of freedom as \u201can\nabsolute beginning ability”. Order and freedom remain therefore in a\npermanent contradiction; this means that freedom is by its nature in opposite\nto all its realization in form of orders: the order of work, of law, of state.\nFreedom must contradict them necessarily. But this aporetic structure is the\npresupposition of its finite realization. That means: we can reach always only finite\nfreedom in finite orders. The orders we found therefore have to be reformed continuously.\nSuch finite orders are suitable for the realization of freedom only, if they\nreflect the basic contradiction of freedom and order in itself. It follows\nthat neither human orders are unconditional perfect orders, nor that human freedom\nis realized totally in any kind of order. The pitfalls of this dilemma are the absolute\nreduction of freedom at the cost of the order, or vice versa, the absolute\nreduction of the order at the expense of freedom. To avoid these pitfalls,\nthe relationship between order and freedom or system and freedom have to be determined\ndialectically. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The “deal of freedom” (\u201ecommercium libertatis\u201c), which is\na dialectical one of finite freedom in finite orders, therefore, is always a\nvery challenging, even exhausting business which has to deal continuously with\ncertain dilemmas, aporias and problems. But sophisticated transactions require the\nwisdom and the wise. Thomas Aquinas mentioned: “Sapientis est\nordinare”: It is the task of wise man to establish or create order. When we\nread the sentence from the other way around then every emergence of finite order\nmay be understood as a manifestation of wisdom. Wisdom is not an\nautonomous producer of order. But the wise man moderates the free forces\nin this game so that they can cooperate together freely and find an reasonable\norder of freedom. Some\nbibliographical remarks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hendrich, G. (2004). Islam und Aufkl\u00e4rung: Der Modernediskurs in der arabischen\nPhilosophie<\/em>.\nDarmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hendrich, G. (2005). Arabisch.islamische\nPhilosophie: Geschichte und Gegenwart<\/em>. Frankfurt\/New York: Campus.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Krings, H. (1979). Der Preis der Freiheit: Zum Verh\u00e4ltnis von\nIdee und Wirklichkeit der Freiheit im 20. Jahrhundert<\/em>. In A. Paus (Ed.), Werte,\nRechte, Normen <\/em>(pp. 11\u201327). Graz.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Krings, H. (1980). System\nund Freiheit: Gesammelte Aufs\u00e4tze. <\/em>(Krings, H., Ed.). Freiburg i.\nBr.\/M\u00fcnchen: Alber.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Krings, H. (1985).\nReale Freiheit. Praktische Freiheit- Transzendentale Freiheit. Zeitschrift\nf\u00fcr philosophische Forschung<\/em>, 39<\/em>, 59\u201377.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Krings, H. (1986). Zur\nModernit\u00e4tskritik der Kirchen: Kommentar zu Ernst-Wolfgang B\u00f6ckenf\u00f6rde. In P.\nKoslowski, R. Spaemann, & R. L\u00f6w (Eds.), Civitas-Resultate: Vol. 10.\nModerne oder Postmoderne? Zur Signatur des gegenw\u00e4rtigen Zeitalters <\/em>(pp. 130\u2013136).\nWeinheim: Acta Humaniora VCH.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Krings, H. (1987).\nWoher kommt die Moderne?: Zur Vorgeschichte der neuzeitlichen Freiheitsidee bei\nWilhelm von Ockham. Zeitschrift f\u00fcr philosophische Forschung<\/em>, 41<\/em>(1),\n3\u201318.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Krings, H. (1989).\nSapientis est ordinare. In W. Oelm\u00fcller (Ed.), Philosophie und Weisheit <\/em>(pp. 161\u2013165).\nPaderborn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kuhn, H., &\nWiedmann, F. (Eds.). (1960). Das Problem der Ordnung: 6. Deutscher Kongre\u00df\nf\u00fcr Philosophie – M\u00fcnchen 1960<\/em>. Meisenheim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Marquard, O. (2000).\nHomo compensator. In O. Marquard (Ed.), Philosophie des Stattdessen <\/em>(pp. 11\u201329).\nStuttgart: Reclam.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Veith, O. (1952). Ordo\nund Ordnung: Versuch einer Synthese. Ordo (Jahrbuch f\u00fcr die Ordnung in\nWirtschaft und Gesellschaft)<\/em>, 5<\/em>, 3\u201347.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wildfeuer, A. G. Das\n“gute” oder “gelingende Leben” im Ethos der Demokratie. In\nJ. Hahn & u.a. (Eds.), Erreicht oder reicht uns die Demokratie. 5.\nSymposium des Professorenforums am 12.\/13. April 2002 an der J. W.\nGoethe-Universit\u00e4t <\/em>(pp. 217\u2013239). Frankfurt a.M.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wildfeuer, A. G.\n(2000). Um der Freiheit willen: Zur legitimationstheoretischen Rekonstruktion\neines origin\u00e4ren Erziehungs- und Bildungsauftrages des\nfreiheitlich-demokratischen Verfassungsstaates. In N. N.-W. U. Glatzel (Ed.), Christliche\nSozialethik im Dialog. Zur Zukunftsf\u00e4higkeit von Wirtschaft, Politik und\nGesellschaft <\/em>(pp. 297\u2013316). Grafschaft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wildfeuer, A. G.\n(2006). Athens and Alexandria: Linking to the Common\nIntellectual Roots as a Precondition to Establish a Rational Order of\nCoexistence between the Eastern and the Western World. In H. Theisen & W.\nMustafa (Eds.), Modernism and Post-Modernism. North-South Interaction,\nReinterpretation, Future Prospects <\/em>(pp. 110\u2013134). Bethlehem\/Palestine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wildfeuer, A. G. (2013). Art. Vernunft. In P. Kolmer & A. G.\nWildfeuer (Eds.), Neues Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe <\/em>(pp. 2333\u20132370).\nDarmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wildfeuer, A. G.\n(2014). Dia-Logos: Vernunft – eine friedensstiftende Orientierungsgr\u00f6\u00dfe. In G.\nAugustin, S. Sailer-Pfister, & K. Vellguth (Eds.), Theologie im Dialog:\nVol. 12. Christentum im Dialog. Perspektiven christlicher Identit\u00e4t in einer\npluralen Gesellschaft <\/em>(pp. 129\u2013142). Freiburg i. Br.: Herder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wildfeuer, A. G.\n(2016). Das Subjekt als Geltungsinstanz. Die Vorgeschichte seiner Entdeckung im\nRaum christlicher Metaphysik, in: Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift\nCommunio 45, 299-308.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Abstract: I speak as a philosopher about the problem of the dialectical relation between our ideas of \u201creason\u201d and \u201cfreedom\u201d […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1808,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-ideengeschichte","category-uncategorized"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1797","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1797"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1797\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1809,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1797\/revisions\/1809"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1808"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1797"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1797"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/armin-wildfeuer.de\/wordpress\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1797"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}1 The\nproblem: the relation between order and freedom<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
1.1 The anthropological starting point: The human need\nfor orientation<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
1.2 In\nquestion: Which order \u2013 which freedom – which priority?<\/a> <\/h3>\n\n\n\n
1.3 The <\/a>perspective: an order of freedom?<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2 A short history of the problem: The struggle for the primacy of freedom or order<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
2.1 The objective reason of the cosmos and the\nprimacy of the cosmic order<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2.2 The medieval\n\u201cordo\u201d-thinking: human freedom under the primacy of an absolute order<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2.2.1 From\nimmanent to transcendent principle of order: God as an absolute reason<\/a><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
2.2.2\nChristian Thinking and rational understanding: divine order and human freedom \u2013\na relation of obedience <\/h4>\n\n\n\n
2.3 Order under\nthe primacy of absolute freedom<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2.4 The universalization\nof the primacy of freedom in modernity<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
2.5 The misunderstanding\nof freedom and the depotentiation of reason and order<\/a><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
3 An order\nof freedom: \u201csapientis est ordinare\u201d<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n